It is a privilege to join you this afternoon at one of the
world’s premier security conferences.
We meet at a fraught moment. For too long, along with other
nations, we enjoyed the extraordinary benefits of modern technology without
adequately preparing for its considerable risks. Director of National
Intelligence Dan Coats elevated the alarm last week, when he stated that “the
digital infrastructure that serves this country is literally under attack.”
That is one of the rare instances when the word literally is used literally.
Our adversaries are developing cyber tools not only to steal
our secrets and mislead our citizens, but also to disable our infrastructure by
gaining control of computer networks.
Every day, malicious cyber actors infiltrate computers and
accounts of individual citizens, businesses, the military, and all levels of
government. Director Coats revealed that our adversaries “target[] government
and businesses in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation and critical
manufacturing sectors.” They cause billions of dollars in losses, preposition
cyber tools they could use for future attacks, and try to degrade our political
system. So combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled threats to national security
is a top priority of the Department of Justice.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions established a Cyber-Digital
Task Force in February to consider two questions: What are we doing now to
address cyber threats? And how can we do
better?
Today, the Department of Justice is releasing a report that
responds to the first question, providing a detailed assessment of the cyber
threats confronting America and the Department’s efforts to combat them.
The Task Force report addresses a wide range of issues, including
how to define the multi-faceted challenges of cyber-enabled crime; develop
strategies to detect, deter and disrupt threats; inform victims and the public
about dangers; and maintain a skilled workforce.
The report describes six categories of cyber threats, and
explains how the Department of Justice is working to combat them.
One serious type of threat involves direct damage to
computer systems, such as Distributed Denial of Service attacks and ransomware
schemes.
Another category is data theft, which includes stealing
personally identifiable information and intellectual property.
The third category encompasses cyber-enabled fraud schemes.
A fourth category includes threats to personal privacy, such
as sextortion and other forms of blackmail and harassment.
Attacks on critical infrastructure constitute the fifth
category. They include infiltrating energy systems, transportation systems, and
telecommunications networks.
Each of those complex and evolving threats is serious, and
the report details the important work that the Department of Justice is doing
to protect America from them.
I plan to focus today on a sixth category of cyber-enabled
threats: malign foreign influence operations, described in chapter one of the
task force report.
The term “malign foreign influence operations” refers to
actions undertaken by a foreign government, often covertly, to influence
people’s opinions and advance the foreign nation’s strategic objectives. The
goals frequently include creating and exacerbating social divisions and
undermining confidence in democratic institutions.
Influence operations are a form of information warfare.
Covert propaganda and disinformation are among the primary weapons.
The Russian effort to influence the 2016 presidential election
is just one tree in a growing forest. Focusing merely on a single election
misses the point. As Director Coats made clear, “these actions are persistent,
they are pervasive, and they are meant to undermine America’s democracy on a
daily basis, regardless of whether it is election time or not.”
Russian intelligence officers did not stumble onto the ideas
of hacking American computers and posting misleading messages because they had
a free afternoon. It is what they do
every day.
This is not a new phenomenon. Throughout the twentieth
century, the Soviet Union used malign influence operations against the United
States and many other countries. In
1963, for example, the KGB paid an American to distribute a book claiming that
the FBI and the CIA assassinated President Kennedy.
In 1980, the KGB fabricated and distributed a fake document
claiming that there was a National Security Council strategy to prevent black
political activists from working with African leaders.
During the Reagan Administration, the KGB spread fake
stories that the Pentagon developed the AIDS virus as part of a biological
weapons research program.
As Jonathan Swift wrote in 1710, “Falsehood flies, and the
Truth comes limping after it.”
The Reagan Administration confronted the problem head
on. It established an interagency
committee called “the Active Measures Working Group” to counter Soviet
disinformation. The group exposed Soviet
forgeries and other propaganda.
Modern technology vastly expands the speed and effectiveness
of disinformation campaigns. The
Internet and social media platforms allow foreign agents to spread misleading
political messages while masquerading as Americans.
Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen explained last
weekend that our adversaries “us[e] social media, sympathetic spokespeople and
other fronts to sow discord and divisiveness amongst the American people.”
Elections provide an attractive opportunity for foreign
influence campaigns to undermine our political processes. According to the intelligence community
assessment, foreign interference in the 2016 election “demonstrated a
significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort
compared to previous operations.”
The Department’s Cyber-Digital Task Force report contributes
to our understanding by identifying five different types of malign foreign
influence operations that target our political processes.
First, malicious cyber actors can target election
infrastructure by trying to hack voter registration databases and vote-tallying
systems. In 2016, foreign cyber
intruders targeted election-related networks in as many as 21 states. There is
no evidence that any foreign government ever succeeded in changing votes, but
the risk is real. Moreover, even the
possibility that manipulation may occur can cause citizens to question the
integrity of elections.
Second, cyber operations can target political organizations,
campaigns, and public officials. Foreign
actors can steal private information through hacking, then publish it online to
damage a candidate, campaign, or political party. They can even alter that stolen information
to promote their desired narrative.
Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations
against both major U.S. political parties in 2016, and the recent indictment of
Russian intelligence officers alleges a systematic effort to leak stolen
campaign information.
The third category of malign influence operations affecting
elections involves offers to assist political campaigns or public officials by
agents who conceal their connection to a foreign government. Such operations
may entail financial and logistical support to unwitting Americans.
Fourth, adversaries covertly use disinformation and other
propaganda to influence American public opinion. Foreign trolls spread false stories online
about candidates and issues, amplify divisive political messages to make them
appear more pervasive and credible, and try to pit groups against each
other. They may also try to affect voter
behavior by triggering protests or depressing voter turnout.
Finally, foreign governments use overt influence efforts,
such as government-controlled media outlets and paid lobbyists. Those tactics
may be employed lawfully if the foreign agents comply with registration
requirements. But people should be aware when lobbyists or media outlets are
working for a foreign government so they can evaluate the source’s credibility.
Particularly when respected figures argue in favor of foreign interests, it may
matter to know that they are taking guidance from a foreign nation.
The election-interference charges filed in February
demonstrate how easily human “trolls” distribute propaganda and disinformation.
A Russian man recently admitted to a reporter that he worked with the trolls,
in a separate department creating fake news for his own country. He “felt like
a character in the book ‘1984’ by George Orwell – a place where you have to
write that white is black and black is white.… [Y]ou were in some kind of
factory that turned lying ... into an industrial assembly line. The volumes
were colossal – there were huge numbers of people, 300 to 400, and they were
all writing absolute untruths.”
When the man took a test for a promotion to the department
working to fool Americans, he explained, “The main thing was showing that you
are able to … represent yourself as an American.”
The former troll believes that Russian audiences pay no
attention to fake internet comments. But he has a different opinion about
Americans. He thinks that we can be deceived, because Americans “aren’t used to
this kind of trickery.”
That remark is sort of a compliment. In repressive regimes,
people always assume that the government controls media outlets. We live in a
country that allows free speech, so people are accustomed to taking it
seriously when other citizens express their opinions. But not everyone realizes that information
posted on the Internet may not even come from citizens.
Moreover, Internet comments may not even come from human
beings. Automated bots magnify the impact of propaganda. Using software to
mimic actions by human users, bots can
circulate messages automatically, creating the appearance that thousands
of people are reading and forwarding information. Together, bots and networks
of paid trolls operating multiple accounts allow foreign agents to quickly
spread disinformation and create the false impression that it is widely
accepted.
The United States is not alone in confronting malign foreign
influence. Russia reportedly conducted a hack-and-release campaign against
President Macron during last year’s French elections, and instituted similar
operations against political candidates in other European democracies. Other
foreign nations also engage in malign influence activities.
So what can we do to defend our values in the face of
foreign efforts to influence elections, weaken the social fabric, and turn
Americans against each other? Like terrorism and other national security
threats, the malign foreign influence threat requires a unified, strategic
approach across all government agencies. The Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security, State, Defense, Treasury, Intelligence agencies, and others play
important roles.
Other sectors of society also need to do their part. State
and local governments must secure their election infrastructure. Technology
companies need to prevent misuse of their platforms. Public officials, campaigns, and other potential
victims need to study the threats and protect themselves and their
networks. And citizens need to
understand the playing field.
The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes malign
foreign influence activity that violates federal criminal law. Some critics argue against prosecuting people
who live in foreign nations that are unlikely to extradite their citizens. That
is a shortsighted view.
For one thing, the defendants may someday face trial, if
there is a change in their government or if they visit any nation that
cooperates with America in enforcing the rule of law. Modern forms of travel
and communication readily allow criminals to cross national boundaries. Do not
underestimate the long arm of American law – or the persistence of American law
enforcement. People who thought they were safely under the protection of
foreign governments when they committed crimes against America sometimes later
find themselves in federal prisons.
Second, public indictments achieve specific deterrence by
impeding the defendants from traveling to rule-of-law nations and raising the
risk they will be held accountable for future cybercrime. Wanted criminals are less attractive
co-conspirators.
Third, demonstrating our ability to detect and publicly
charge hackers will deter some others from engaging in similar conduct.
Fourth, federal indictments are taken seriously by the
public and the international community, where respect for our criminal justice
system – including an understanding of the presumption of innocence and the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt – means that our willingness to
present evidence to a grand jury and ultimately at trial elicits a high degree
of confidence in our allegations.
Fifth, victims deserve vindication, particularly when they
are harmed by criminal acts that would be prosecuted if the perpetrator were
located in the United States.
Sixth, federal criminal investigations support other
penalties for malign foreign influence operations. For example, the Department
of the Treasury can impose financial sanctions on defendants based on evidence
exposed in indictments. Voters in foreign democracies, and influential citizens
in autocratic regimes, can consider the allegations in making their own
decisions about national leadership and foreign alliances.
The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on the
individuals and entities identified in the February election-interference
indictment, along with others engaged in malign activities. Nineteen
individuals and five entities are subject to sanctions that freeze assets under
American jurisdiction. Even if they are never brought to court, they will face
consequences.
The sanctions forbid those individuals and entities from
engaging in transactions with Americans and using the American financial
system. The Administration followed up with similar financial sanctions for a
broader range of malign activities against seven oligarchs, 12 companies, 17
Russian government officials, and two other entities.
Prosecutions are one useful tool to help deter modern
criminals who remain beyond our shores. The same approach applies outside the
context of crimes committed to influence elections. That is why our government
regularly files charges against criminals who hide overseas, such as Iranian
government hackers who broke into computer networks of a dam; Iranian hackers
who infiltrated American universities, businesses and government agencies for
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; an Iranian hacker who infiltrated and
extorted a television network; Chinese government hackers who committed
economic espionage; and Russian intelligence officers who stole data from an
email service provider.
Intelligence assessments and criminal indictments are based
on evidence. They do not reflect mere
guesses. Intelligence assessments include analytical judgments based on
classified information that cannot be disclosed because the evidence is from
sources — people who will be unable to help in the future if they are
identified and might be harmed in retaliation for helping America — and methods — techniques that would be
worthless if our adversaries knew how we obtained the evidence. Indictments are based on credible evidence
that the government must be prepared to introduce in court if necessary.
Some people may believe they can operate anonymously on the
Internet, but cybercrime generally creates electronic trails that lead to the
perpetrators.
Gathering intelligence about adversaries who threaten our
way of life is a noble task. Outside the Department of Justice headquarters
stands a statue of Nathan Hale. Hale was executed immediately, without a trial,
after he was caught gathering intelligence for America during the Revolutionary
War. His final words are recorded as follows: “I am so satisfied with the cause
in which I have engaged, that my only regret is that I have but one life to
offer in its service.”
The days when foreign criminals could cause harm inside
America from remote locations without fear of consequences are past. If hostile
governments choose to give sanctuary to perpetrators of malicious cybercrimes
after we identify them, those governments will need to take responsibility for
the crimes, and individual perpetrators will need to consider the personal
cost.
But criminal prosecutions and financial sanctions are not a
complete solution. We need to take other steps to prevent malicious behavior.
To protect elections, the first priority is to harden our
infrastructure. State governments run
American elections and are responsible for maintaining cybersecurity, but they
need federal help. The Department of
Homeland Security takes the lead in helping to protect voting infrastructure,
and the FBI leads federal investigations of intrusions.
The FBI works closely with DHS to inform election
administrators about threats. DHS and
the FBI provide briefings to election officials from all fifty states about our
foreign adversaries’ intentions and capabilities.
We also seek to protect political organizations, campaigns,
candidates, and public officials. The FBI alerts potential victims about
malicious cyber activities and helps them respond to intrusions. It shares detailed information about threats
and vulnerabilities.
To combat covert foreign influence on public policy, we
enforce federal laws that require foreign agents to register with the U.S.
government. Those laws prohibit foreign nationals from tricking unwitting
Americans while concealing that they are following orders from foreign government
handlers. The Department of Justice is
stepping up enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and related
laws, and providing defensive counterintelligence briefings to local, state,
and federal leaders and candidates.
Public attribution of foreign influence operations can help
to counter and mitigate the harm caused by foreign government-sponsored
disinformation. When people are aware of the true sponsor, they can make
better-informed decisions.
We also help technology companies to counter covert foreign
influence efforts. The FBI works with
partners in the Intelligence Community to identify foreign agents as they
establish their digital infrastructure and develop their online presence. The FBI helps technology companies disrupt
foreign influence operations, by identifying foreign agents’ activities so
companies may consider the voluntary removal of accounts and content that
violate terms of service and deceive customers.
Technology companies bear primary responsibility for
securing their products, platforms, and services from misuse. Many are now taking greater responsibility
for self-policing, including by removing fake accounts. We encourage them to
make it a priority to combat efforts to use their facilities for illegal
schemes.
Even as we enhance our efforts to combat existing forms of
malign influence, the danger continues to grow. Advancing technology may enable
adversaries to create propaganda in new and unforeseen ways. Our government
must continue to identify and counter them.
Exposing schemes to the public is an important way to
neutralize them. The American people have a right to know if foreign
governments are targeting them with propaganda.
In some cases, our ability to expose foreign influence
operations may be limited by our obligation to protect intelligence sources and
methods, and defend the integrity of investigations.
Moreover, we should not publicly attribute activity to a
source unless we possess high confidence that foreign agents are responsible.
We also do not want to unduly amplify an adversary’s messages, or impose
additional harm on victims.
In all cases, partisan political considerations must play no
role in our efforts. We cannot seek to benefit or harm any lawful group,
individual or organization. Our government does not take any official position
on what people should believe or how they should vote, but it can and should
protect them from fraud and deception perpetrated by foreign agents.
Unfettered speech about political issues lies at the heart
of our Constitution. It is not the government’s job to determine whether
political opinions are right or wrong.
But that does not leave the government powerless to address
the national security danger when a foreign government engages in covert
information warfare. The First Amendment does not preclude us from publicly
identifying and countering foreign government-sponsored propaganda.
It is not always easy to balance the many competing concerns
in deciding whether, when, and how the government should disclose information
about deceptive foreign activities relevant to elections. The challenge calls
for the application of neutral principles.
The Cyber-Digital Task Force Report identifies factors the
Department of Justice should consider in determining whether to disclose
foreign influence operations. The policy reflects an effort to articulate
neutral principles so that when the issue the government confronted in 2016
arises again – as it surely will – there will be a framework to address it.
Meanwhile, the FBI’s operational Foreign Influence Task
Force coordinates investigations of foreign influence campaigns. That task force integrates the FBI’s cyber,
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal law enforcement resources
to ensure that we understand threats and respond appropriately. The FBI task
force works with other federal agencies, state and local authorities,
international partners, and the private sector.
Before I conclude, I want to emphasize that covert
propaganda disseminated by foreign adversaries is fundamentally different from
domestic partisan wrangling. As Senator Margaret Chase Smith proclaimed in her
1950 declaration of conscience, we must address foreign national security
threats “patriotically as Americans,” and not “politically as Republicans and
Democrats.”
President Reagan’s Under Secretary of State, Lawrence
Eagleburger, wrote about Soviet active measures in 1983. He said that “it is as
unwise to ignore the threat as it is to become obsessed with the myth of a
super Soviet conspiracy manipulating our essential political processes.” He
maintained that free societies must expose disinformation on a “persistent and
continuing” basis.
Over the past year, Congress passed three statutes
encouraging the Executive Branch to investigate, expose, and counter malign
foreign influence operations. Publicly exposing such activities has long been a
feature of U.S. law. The Foreign Agents
Registration Act, which Congress enacted in 1938 to deter Nazi propagandists,
mandates that the American public know when foreign governments seek to
influence them.
Knowledge is power. In 1910, Theodore Roosevelt delivered a
timeless speech about the duties of citizenship. It is best known for the
remark that “it is not the critic who counts.” But Roosevelt’s most insightful
observation is that the success or failure of a republic depends on the
character of the average citizen. It is up to individual citizens to consider
the source and evaluate the credibility of information when they decide what to
believe.
Heated debates and passionate disagreements about public
policy and political leadership are essential to democracy. We resolve those
disagreements at the ballot box, and then we keep moving forward to future
elections that reflect the will of citizens. Foreign governments should not be
secret participants, covertly spreading propaganda and fanning the flames of
division.
The government plays a central role in combating malign
foreign influence and other cyber threats. The Attorney General’s Cyber-Digital
Task Force report demonstrates that the Department of Justice is doing its part
to faithfully execute our oath to preserve, protect, and defend America.
I regret that my time today is insufficient to describe the
report in greater detail. It is available on the Department of Justice website.
I hope you read it and find it a useful contribution to public discussion about
one of the most momentous issues of our time.
In brief, the report explains that we must continually adapt
criminal justice and intelligence tools to combat hackers and other
cybercriminals. Traditional criminal justice is most often characterized by
police chasing criminals and eyewitnesses pointing out perpetrators in
courtrooms. Cybercrime requires additional tools and techniques.
We limit cybercrime damage by seizing or disabling servers,
domain names, and other infrastructure that criminals use to facilitate
attacks. We shut down the dark markets
where criminals buy and sell stolen information. We restore control of
compromised computers. We share information gathered during our investigations
to help potential victims protect themselves.
We seek restitution for victims. We pursue attribution and
accountability for perpetrators. And we expose governments that defraud and
deceive our citizens.
The Task Force report is just one aspect of our efforts. It
is a detailed snapshot of how the Department of Justice assesses and addresses
current cyber threats. The work continues, and not just within our Department.
Our government is doing more now than ever to combat malign
foreign influence and other cyber threats. Trump Administration agency
appointees and White House officials work with career professionals every day
to prevent cybercrime and protect elections.
Our adversaries will never relent in their efforts to
undermine America, so we must remain eternally vigilant in the defense of
liberty, and the pursuit of justice. And we must approach each new threat
united in our commitment to the principle reflected in the motto adopted at the
founding of our Republic: e pluribus unum.
Thank you.
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