The phrase narco-terrorism evokes images of masked cartel gunmen and extremist insurgents, each wielding violence to impose their will. Yet the most dangerous reality is not their separate existence but their convergence. When drug cartels—motivated by profit—collaborate with terrorist groups—driven by ideology—the result is a hybrid threat capable of destabilizing communities, corrupting institutions, and undermining national security. For American cities within 100 miles of the U.S.–Mexico border, this convergence is not a distant possibility. It is a daily concern for local law enforcement, who find themselves on the frontline of an evolving battle that fuses organized crime with insurgency tactics.
Historical Roots of Narco-Terrorism
The term “narco-terrorism” first gained prominence in the 1980s, when Colombian drug lords like Pablo Escobar used car bombs, assassinations, and intimidation to sway judges, politicians, and the public (Felbab-Brown, 2009). These cartels recognized that terrorism was not just a tool of ideology—it was a means of business protection and expansion.
Colombia also offers another example of convergence. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), originally a Marxist insurgency, gradually relied on drug trafficking to finance operations. This blurred the line between politically motivated terrorism and profit-driven organized crime (Crandall, 2002). What began as ideology transformed into narco-insurgency, proving that criminal enterprises and extremist movements could thrive together.
The lessons from Colombia are not merely historical. They resonate along the U.S.–Mexico border today, where cartels wield power that rivals paramilitary forces and extremist groups seek access to smuggling networks.
The Cartel–Terrorist Nexus
Drug cartels and terrorist groups converge for three reasons: money, logistics, and tactics.
Money: Cartels generate billions annually through narcotics, human smuggling, and extortion. Terrorist groups, often cash-strapped, see financial benefit in collaboration. Cartels, in turn, may launder extremist funds or provide access to illicit financial networks.
Logistics: Cartels control established smuggling routes across borders, using tunnels, drones, and hidden compartments. Terrorist groups may leverage these routes to move weapons, operatives, or materials.
Tactics: Cartels have adopted methods once associated with insurgents—improvised explosive devices (IEDs), armored convoys, propaganda videos, and even drones for surveillance or attack. In some cases, extremists borrow cartel methods, creating a feedback loop of violence and innovation.
While direct, long-term alliances between major Mexican cartels and groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS remain unproven, intelligence reports confirm transactional relationships where ideology meets profit (U.S. DEA, 2020). Even limited collaboration magnifies risks for U.S. law enforcement and border communities.
Border-City Vulnerabilities
Cities within 100 miles of the U.S.–Mexico border—El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, Nogales, Yuma, and others—are especially vulnerable to narco-terror spillover. Local police departments in these communities encounter cartel activity daily: drug seizures, gang violence, and human trafficking. Adding terrorist convergence raises the stakes dramatically.
Spillover Violence: Gunfights between cartel-linked gangs can erupt in U.S. neighborhoods, endangering civilians.
Community Intimidation: Immigrant populations, particularly those undocumented, are targets for cartel extortion, making them hesitant to cooperate with police.
Infrastructure Stress: Hospitals, schools, and local services face strain when waves of trafficking or cartel violence overwhelm capacity.
Cross-Border Flow: Drugs move north; cash and weapons move south. Terrorist infiltration—while less common—could exploit the same corridors.
For border law enforcement, the threat is not abstract. Patrol officers may stumble upon cartel operatives while conducting routine traffic stops, only to discover weapons caches or intelligence links pointing toward extremist cooperation.
Operational Challenges for Local Law Enforcement
Despite being at the forefront, local agencies face disproportionate challenges:
Jurisdictional Complexity: Coordination with Border Patrol, DEA, FBI, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces is essential but often fragmented.
Training Gaps: Local officers are rarely trained in counterterrorism tactics or financial crime investigation, yet they are often the first to encounter cartel-linked actors.
Resource Limitations: Small-town departments lack advanced tools such as drone detection, encrypted communications, or dedicated intelligence units.
Officer Safety: Cartels employ ambushes, counter-surveillance, and high-powered rifles, making routine police work increasingly dangerous.
These pressures mirror historical eras when American law enforcement was outgunned by organized crime during Prohibition or drug wars of the 1980s. Today’s frontier, however, is marked by the blending of transnational crime and terrorism.
Narco-Terrorism in Practice: Emerging Trends
Explosives and Terror Tactics: Cartels in Mexico have deployed car bombs, grenades, and IEDs against rivals and government forces. U.S. law enforcement fears these tactics may cross the border.
Arms-for-Drugs Deals: Extremist groups may exchange weapons or technology for narcotics profits.
Propaganda Symbiosis: Both cartels and terrorists use media to instill fear—cartels with graphic violence, extremists with ideological messaging.
Cyber Convergence: Cartels increasingly use encrypted communications, online banking, and cryptocurrency. Extremists exploit similar digital tools. Together, they expand the “digital underground” beyond traditional reach.
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement
Despite the daunting nature of narco-terrorism, border law enforcement can take practical steps to strengthen resilience:
Intelligence Sharing: Regular participation in regional fusion centers ensures that even small-town departments receive timely cartel-terror intelligence.
Community Policing: Building trust in immigrant neighborhoods encourages reporting of cartel intimidation. Witnesses protected by police cooperation can provide critical leads.
Cross-Border Partnerships: While fraught with corruption risks, vetted partnerships with Mexican units can provide valuable intelligence.
Specialized Training: Officers should receive training in cartel identification, extremist finance tracking, and counter-IED awareness.
Technology Investment: Grants for license plate readers, surveillance drones, and forensic labs help local departments counter sophisticated networks.
The Role of Federal and State Support
Local law enforcement cannot fight narco-terrorism alone. Federal and state governments must provide:
Funding: Dedicated grants to equip and train border agencies, similar to DHS’s Urban Area Security Initiative.
Policy Alignment: Narco-terrorism must be clearly defined under law to avoid gaps between criminal and terrorism statutes.
Task Force Expansion: DEA, FBI, and DHS-led joint teams must deepen integration with local departments.
Public Communication: Federal and state leaders should educate communities on cartel threats without fostering fear or xenophobia.
Only through vertical integration of resources—from federal agencies down to local patrols—can the United States effectively counter the narco-terror threat.
Looking Forward: The Future of Narco-Terrorism
Several emerging risks suggest that the problem will not diminish:
Militarization of Cartels: Mexican cartels increasingly resemble insurgent armies, with armored convoys, drones, and heavy weapons.
Globalized Alliances: Cartels have been linked to networks in Europe, Africa, and Asia; extremist groups with global reach may intersect with these pipelines.
Digital Narco-Terrorism: Online recruitment, money laundering through cryptocurrency, and drone surveillance expand operational capacity.
Domestic Radicalization: U.S.-based gangs with cartel ties could merge with ideological movements, bringing narco-terrorism inside American cities.
These developments foreshadow a threat environment in which the line between crime and war, profit and ideology, becomes ever more blurred.
Conclusion
Narco-terrorism is not simply the merging of two threats—it is the amplification of both. The convergence of cartels and extremist groups produces an adversary with the profit power of organized crime and the fear-inducing tactics of terrorism. For local law enforcement near America’s southern border, this convergence is already at the doorstep.
History shows that law enforcement evolves when confronted with new enemies—whether mobsters during Prohibition or cartels in the 1980s. Today’s challenge is more complex, demanding partnerships, intelligence, training, and resilience. The thin blue line in border communities is not just about keeping drugs off the streets—it is about defending the homeland from a hybrid threat that fuses the ambitions of criminals with the ruthlessness of extremists.
References
Crandall, R. (2002). Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Felbab-Brown, V. (2009). Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. Brookings Institution Press.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. (2020). National Drug Threat Assessment. Department of Justice.
Would you like me to also design a visual map-style infographic showing the cartel–terror convergence points (money, weapons, routes, tactics) so it matches the pathogen and infrastructure graphics we’ve done for the other essays?
KANSAS
CITY, Mo. – R. Matthew Price, United States Attorney for the Western
District of Missouri, recognized six local and federal law enforcement
officers for their work on significant investigations as recipients of
the 2025 Guardian of Justice Award.
The award recipients were
honored on Aug. 21, 2025, during the 23rd Annual Law Enforcement
Coordinating Committee Training Seminar in Springfield, Mo. The
prestigious law enforcement award is presented annually by the Law
Enforcement Coordinating Committee.
Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Isaac McPheeters was recognized for
his investigation of two members of the self-styled 2nd American Militia
who conspired to go “to war with border patrol.” The conspiracy to
murder Border Patrol officers and immigrants was thwarted after one of
the conspirators attempted to murder FBI agents by firing at them as
they executed a search warrant on the eve of their planned trip to the
United States – Mexico border.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Special Agent Jerry Wine, along with ATF
Task Force Officers David Schroeder (Greene County Sheriff’s Office),
Justin Gargus (Christian County Sheriff’s Office), Eric Pinegar
(Springfield Police Department), and Evan Nicholson (Springfield Police
Department) were recognized for their efforts in reducing violent gun
crime and gang activity in the Springfield, Mo. area.
“I would
like to congratulate and commend the agents and task force officers for
their effort on these investigations. As a result of their hard work and
dedication, these violent individuals are off the streets and citizens
of the Western District are safer,” said U.S. Attorney Price.
Conspiracy to Murder Border Patrol
After
a two-week jury trial in October and November 2024, Bryan C. Perry, of
Clarksville, Tenn., and Jonathan S. O’Dell, of Warsaw, Mo., were found
guilty of their 2022 conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the
United States government. They also were found guilty of seven counts of
the attempted murder of FBI special agents, seven counts of assaulting
FBI special agents with a deadly weapon, three counts of assaulting FBI
special agents, 14 counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime
of violence, and one count of damaging federal property.
Perry was
also found guilty of two counts of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, one count of possessing body armor by a violent felon, and one
count of threatening to injure another person. Additionally, O’Dell was
found guilty of one count of threatening to injure another person and
pleaded guilty to one count of illegally possessing a firearm while
subject to a court order of protection, one count of making a false
statement to a federal agent, and one count of escaping from custody.
O’Dell and Perry are scheduled to be sentenced on Aug. 26, 2025.
Special
Agent McPheeters coordinated with numerous local and federal agencies
in Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas, at various stages of the complex
investigation. When O’Dell escaped from custody in October 2023, Special
Agent McPheeters and the FBI coordinated a wide-ranging search with
numerous law enforcement agencies across the state of Missouri resulting
in O’Dell’s apprehension within 48 hours.
“Violence against law
enforcement will not be tolerated and recognition of the work to stop
these individuals from carrying out their planned attack is greatly
appreciated. The FBI will do everything it can to ensure the safety and
security of all law enforcement from danger,” said FBI Special Agent in
Charge Stephen Cyrus.
Springfield Area Gun Violence
In
November 2021, the ATF started investigating numerous shooting
incidents including drive-by shootings and homicides in the Springfield,
Mo., area involving juveniles and young adults. The shootings were in
neighborhoods or crowded areas, endangering innocent citizens. Using
crime gun data, social media profiles, and police reports, the ATF was
able to identify multiple suspects responsible for the uptick in violent
firearms offenses in the area. To date, approximately seven homicides
and multiple drive-by shootings have been linked to these groups and
their activities.
Many of the shooting suspects were identified as
gang members and/or rappers. The primary gangs involved in these
shootings were “F**k The Opps” (FTO) and “Only Da Brothers” (ODB). ATF’s
investigations into the gangs have included street investigations,
surveillance operations, search warrants, adoption of state firearm
cases, examining federal firearm licensee paperwork, analyzing crime gun
data, close coordination with local law enforcement and other federal
law enforcement agencies, studying and understanding these gangs/groups,
their associations and their social media, tracing firearms, submitting
firearms to local crime laboratories and the ATF’s Firearms &
Ammunition Technology Division, and directly assisting in local violent
crime and homicide investigations. The ATF has provided vigorous trial
support and have testified extensively at sentencing hearings.
As
a result of the ATF’s investigation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office has
indicted numerous gang members or associates, including the two
identified leaders of FTO, Ezekiel King and Jardell Williams, both of
Springfield, Mo. King and Williams were each sentenced to 78 months in
federal prison. Of the gang members indicted, nine have been sentenced
to federal prison, two were sentenced to supervised release, and nine
are pending sentencing after pleading guilty. The indictment of multiple
members of FTO and ODB has coincided with a sharp drop in shooting
calls in the Greene County, Mo., area.
“This case is the gold
standard for what can be accomplished when federal, state, and local law
enforcement work side by side to confront violent crime,” said ATF
Special Agent in Charge Bernard Hansen. “By leveraging our collective
resources through a task force, and utilizing crime gun intelligence
tools such as NIBIN, we delivered prison sentences for those violent
gang members who threatened the safety of our communities and a
significant reduction in crime.”
Guardian of Justice Award
The
annual Guardian of Justice Award recognizes a state or local officer as
well as a federal agent for investigative excellence, selfless
collaboration, tireless trial support, commendable diligence and
professionalism, and noteworthy assistance to prosecution. The
prestigious law enforcement award is presented by the Law Enforcement
Coordinating Committee each year during the law enforcement training
seminar.
Walk into a big-box store in 2025 and you’ll find the future of shopping hiding behind Plexiglas. Toothpaste in cages. Deodorant under lock and key. A clerk with a jangling ring of keys, jogging down Aisle 7 like a jailer of Crest and Dove. It’s an image tailor-made for doomscrolling: “America has given up—we even locked the toothpaste.” But is this really a story about runaway crime? Or have we mistaken a symbol for the whole plot?
The short answer: retail theft is up in some places, not everywhere, and the loudest numbers often don’t mean what people think they mean. The longer answer is messier—and more interesting. It lives at the intersection of data gaps, corporate incentives, shifting laws, viral videos, and the emotional power of a locked cabinet to make us feel like society is fraying. Let’s separate the signal from the static.
The toothpaste turned metaphor
Why toothpaste? Because it’s ordinary. When ordinary things get locked up, it screams “crisis” louder than charts ever could. Brands know this. Politicians know this. News producers know this. You do, too—you’ve stood there waiting for someone with a key.
The feelings are real. The question is whether the facts match.
What the best data actually says
Start with the gold-standard, non-partisan read: the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ). Their 2024 report looked closely at shoplifting in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, and compared FBI data sets that don’t even agree with each other. The top-line: compared to 2019, reported shoplifting in 2023 was 87% higher in Los Angeles and 55% higher in New York, while Chicago was lower than pre-2020 in 2023 but rose through 2024. CCJ also found that in a 23-city sample, shoplifting in the first half of 2024 ran 24% higher than in the same period of 2023 (Lopez, 2024).
Stateline put a fine point on it: New York’s shoplifting rose sharply from 2021 to 2022, dipped slightly in 2023, but still sat 55% above 2019; LA’s 2023 level was 87% above 2019, with 2024 undercounts likely due to a reporting-system switch (Hernández, 2024). In short, headline-ready spikes exist—but they’re not universal, and measurement quirks matter.
California’s numbers also complicate the narrative. The Public Policy Institute of California reported that overall crime fell in 2024 and the state’s property crime rate hit a three-decade low—even as shoplifting kept rising, up ~14% year-over-year and ~48% above 2019. Retail theft (shoplifting plus commercial burglary) was up just 3% in 2024, 22.8% above 2019 (Lofstrom, 2025). Translation: retail theft is a meaningful problem—but it’s not the same thing as “crime is exploding.”
The loudest statistic—and why it got retracted
If you’ve seen claims that “organized retail crime” (ORC) accounts for nearly half of retailers’ losses from “shrink,” you’re not alone. That line ricocheted across TV hits and legislative hearings—until the National Retail Federation (NRF) pulled it back. In December 2023, Reuters reported that NRF removed the claim after discovering it leaned on a misinterpretation of older testimony and mismatched data—an error widely amplified in media and lobbying (Masters, 2023).
This matters because big numbers drive big policy. When a marquee statistic turns out to be wrong, everything tethered to it—penalty hikes, funding rejiggers, the narrative that “we’re under siege”—deserves a second look. Stateline summarized the correction bluntly: the “nearly half” figure was closer to about 5% (Hernández, 2024). None of this means ORC isn’t real; it is. It means we should be allergic to iffy math—especially when it’s used to lock up the toothpaste and unlock tougher laws.
Retailers are closing stores. But theft isn’t the only reason.
Another viral driver: store-closure announcements linked to crime. Target’s September 2023 statement is a case study, explicitly citing theft and ORC for closing nine stores across four states and detailing new security investments and partnerships (Target Corporation, 2023).
But zoom out. The Washington Post cautions that closures rarely hinge on a single factor: foot traffic, inflation, rent, local competition, and broader retail shifts all matter. Shrink is a piece—not the whole pie (Peiser, 2023). Some analysts think “crime” sometimes acts as a convenient umbrella term when a store is underperforming for multiple reasons. The bottom line: closures may feature crime, but they co-star economics.
The “we cried too much” moment
You could feel the narrative wobble in January 2023 when Walgreens’ CFO admitted the company might have overstated its shoplifting problem—“maybe we cried too much”—and said shrink had fallen back toward historical levels (Bekiempis, 2023). The comment landed like a pin in a balloon: if a top retailer walked back the alarm, maybe the public panic was outrunning the signal.
Again, nuance: different chains, different neighborhoods, different realities. But the Walgreens mea culpa is a reminder to treat sweeping claims with skepticism, even when they fit our feeds.
Why the numbers are so chaotic
If the data fight feels chaotic, it’s not your imagination. Here’s why:
“Retail theft” isn’t a single metric. Shoplifting is one slice. “Shrink” is bigger (also covering employee theft, miscounts, damage, fraud). ORC is a subset of external theft. Mixing these up can create monster statistics that don’t map to reality (Peiser, 2023).
National data is imperfect. The FBI’s legacy SRS and newer NIBRS systems tell different stories about shoplifting since 2019. Agencies migrated to NIBRS at different times; some places under-report; others changed processes (Lopez, 2024).
Policy shifts change reporting. In Los Angeles, a 2024 records-management switch likely produced an undercount, per CCJ. In California, PPIC cautioned that data coverage issues complicate year-to-year comparisons (Lopez, 2024; Lofstrom, 2025).
Viral videos ≠ baseline reality. A flash-mob clip gets 10 million views; a nuanced spreadsheet gets ten. Perception outruns prevalence—even as some cities genuinely grapple with increases (Peiser, 2023).
So… why is toothpaste locked?
Because retailers optimize for loss prevention and customer flow—and lately, the loss-prevention part is shouting. Target, in its own words, is adding guards, locking some items, and partnering with law enforcement and DHS (Target Corporation, 2023). That can be rational if a specific store faces repeated theft in high-demand items that are easy to flip. But it can also backfire: shoppers hate friction, and the visual of a “caged aisle” amplifies fear, regardless of actual risk.
What the politics are doing to the numbers (and vice versa)
Public policy is rushing in. California passed a package of retail-theft bills in 2024, even as PPIC’s statewide data showed declining overall crime but rising shoplifting (Lofstrom, 2025). Across the country, legislators are tweaking thresholds, aggregation rules, and penalties for repeat offenses. The danger is overshooting—writing laws for the viral edge cases rather than for the data-driven middle.
The real costs nobody shares on LinkedIn
Workers feel it first. Clerks and security staff deal with confrontations and the emotional toll of being told “don’t intervene.” That’s a morale and safety problem, not just a spreadsheet line (Peiser, 2023).
Communities lose convenience. If a store shutters, the neighborhood loses access to basics. Even when stores stay, the customer experience degrades behind plexiglass, and the idea of your town changes—toward distrust (Peiser, 2023).
Trust in institutions wobbles. A widely quoted stat gets retracted; another gets walked back on an earnings call; a third is “under review.” People start to believe nobody is telling the truth. That vacuum is where bad ideas thrive (Masters, 2023; Bekiempis, 2023).
Three realities to hold at the same time
Some cities really are seeing more shoplifting than before the pandemic. CCJ’s city-level work and PPIC’s California trends show real increases in specific contexts (Lopez, 2024; Lofstrom, 2025).
The national picture is muddy. FBI data systems conflict; retailer surveys conflate categories; reporting practices shift. Beware sweeping national declarations built on inconsistent foundations (Lopez, 2024; Peiser, 2023).
The most viral numbers have stumbled. NRF withdrew the bombshell “half of shrink is ORC” line. Walgreens softened its own alarm. When the loudest claims wobble, healthy skepticism is a public service (Masters, 2023; Bekiempis, 2023).
How to fix the conversation (and maybe the problem)
1) Get the measurement right.
We need cleaner, comparable data and clarity on categories. FBI should offer plainer guidance on SRS vs. NIBRS comparability. Retailers should publish standardized shrink breakouts and ORC definitions—and stop mixing them in press-ready soundbites (Lopez, 2024).
2) Target the hot spots, not the headlines.
If a handful of districts see elevated shoplifting, surge solutions there: targeted enforcement against fencing networks, smarter store layouts, and community-based interventions. Remember: many thefts are low-dollar and need non-carceral fixes to actually reduce repeat incidents (Peiser, 2023).
3) Design security that doesn’t punish shoppers.
If you must lock items, do it surgically and test alternatives like shelf-level tagging or quick-unlock technology. Treat the Plexiglas wall as the last resort—not the brand (Peiser, 2023).
4) De-politicize the statistics.
When a powerful trade group retracts a marquee claim and keeps lobbying anyway, the public tunes out. Credibility is a currency—spend it carefully (Masters, 2023).
5) Keep workers safe without turning them into cops.
Training and clear “don’t chase” policies matter. Pair that with law-enforcement focus on fencing rings and repeat crews—not one-off poverty thefts (Peiser, 2023).
The narrative shift we need
Locked-up toothpaste feels like the end of something: the end of trust, of convenience, of the idea that a community can take care of itself. But if we let a symbol set policy, we’ll get performative fixes that look tough on TikTok and do nothing in the shrink ledger. The better story is harder to sell—but it works: aim precision tools at real hot spots, clean up the data, and stop letting a few spectacular videos write the laws for 330 million people.
Because in the end, the goal isn’t to free the toothpaste. It’s to lower theft, protect workers, keep stores open, and treat shoppers like neighbors—not suspects. That’s the kind of story worth going viral.
Walk into a big-box store in 2025 and you’ll find the future of shopping hiding behind Plexiglas. Toothpaste in cages. Deodorant under lock and key. A clerk with a jangling ring of keys, jogging down Aisle 7 like a jailer of Crest and Dove. It’s an image tailor-made for doomscrolling: “America has given up—we even locked the toothpaste.” But is this really a story about runaway crime? Or have we mistaken a symbol for the whole plot?
The short answer: retail theft is up in some places, not everywhere, and the loudest numbers often don’t mean what people think they mean. The longer answer is messier—and more interesting. It lives at the intersection of data gaps, corporate incentives, shifting laws, viral videos, and the emotional power of a locked cabinet to make us feel like society is fraying. Let’s separate the signal from the static.
The toothpaste turned metaphor
Why toothpaste? Because it’s ordinary. When ordinary things get locked up, it screams “crisis” louder than charts ever could. Brands know this. Politicians know this. News producers know this. You do, too—you’ve stood there waiting for someone with a key.
The feelings are real. The question is whether the facts match.
What the best data actually says
Start with the gold-standard, non-partisan read: the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ). Their 2024 report looked closely at shoplifting in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, and compared FBI data sets that don’t even agree with each other. The top-line: compared to 2019, reported shoplifting in 2023 was 87% higher in Los Angeles and 55% higher in New York, while Chicago was lower than pre-2020 in 2023 but rose through 2024. CCJ also found that in a 23-city sample, shoplifting in the first half of 2024 ran 24% higher than in the same period of 2023 (Lopez, 2024).
Stateline put a fine point on it: New York’s shoplifting rose sharply from 2021 to 2022, dipped slightly in 2023, but still sat 55% above 2019; LA’s 2023 level was 87% above 2019, with 2024 undercounts likely due to a reporting-system switch (Hernández, 2024). In short, headline-ready spikes exist—but they’re not universal, and measurement quirks matter.
California’s numbers also complicate the narrative. The Public Policy Institute of California reported that overall crime fell in 2024 and the state’s property crime rate hit a three-decade low—even as shoplifting kept rising, up ~14% year-over-year and ~48% above 2019. Retail theft (shoplifting plus commercial burglary) was up just 3% in 2024, 22.8% above 2019 (Lofstrom, 2025). Translation: retail theft is a meaningful problem—but it’s not the same thing as “crime is exploding.”
The loudest statistic—and why it got retracted
If you’ve seen claims that “organized retail crime” (ORC) accounts for nearly half of retailers’ losses from “shrink,” you’re not alone. That line ricocheted across TV hits and legislative hearings—until the National Retail Federation (NRF) pulled it back. In December 2023, Reuters reported that NRF removed the claim after discovering it leaned on a misinterpretation of older testimony and mismatched data—an error widely amplified in media and lobbying (Masters, 2023).
This matters because big numbers drive big policy. When a marquee statistic turns out to be wrong, everything tethered to it—penalty hikes, funding rejiggers, the narrative that “we’re under siege”—deserves a second look. Stateline summarized the correction bluntly: the “nearly half” figure was closer to about 5% (Hernández, 2024). None of this means ORC isn’t real; it is. It means we should be allergic to iffy math—especially when it’s used to lock up the toothpaste and unlock tougher laws.
Retailers are closing stores. But theft isn’t the only reason.
Another viral driver: store-closure announcements linked to crime. Target’s September 2023 statement is a case study, explicitly citing theft and ORC for closing nine stores across four states and detailing new security investments and partnerships (Target Corporation, 2023).
But zoom out. The Washington Post cautions that closures rarely hinge on a single factor: foot traffic, inflation, rent, local competition, and broader retail shifts all matter. Shrink is a piece—not the whole pie (Peiser, 2023). Some analysts think “crime” sometimes acts as a convenient umbrella term when a store is underperforming for multiple reasons. The bottom line: closures may feature crime, but they co-star economics.
The “we cried too much” moment
You could feel the narrative wobble in January 2023 when Walgreens’ CFO admitted the company might have overstated its shoplifting problem—“maybe we cried too much”—and said shrink had fallen back toward historical levels (Bekiempis, 2023). The comment landed like a pin in a balloon: if a top retailer walked back the alarm, maybe the public panic was outrunning the signal.
Again, nuance: different chains, different neighborhoods, different realities. But the Walgreens mea culpa is a reminder to treat sweeping claims with skepticism, even when they fit our feeds.
Why the numbers are so chaotic
If the data fight feels chaotic, it’s not your imagination. Here’s why:
“Retail theft” isn’t a single metric. Shoplifting is one slice. “Shrink” is bigger (also covering employee theft, miscounts, damage, fraud). ORC is a subset of external theft. Mixing these up can create monster statistics that don’t map to reality (Peiser, 2023).
National data is imperfect. The FBI’s legacy SRS and newer NIBRS systems tell different stories about shoplifting since 2019. Agencies migrated to NIBRS at different times; some places under-report; others changed processes (Lopez, 2024).
Policy shifts change reporting. In Los Angeles, a 2024 records-management switch likely produced an undercount, per CCJ. In California, PPIC cautioned that data coverage issues complicate year-to-year comparisons (Lopez, 2024; Lofstrom, 2025).
Viral videos ≠ baseline reality. A flash-mob clip gets 10 million views; a nuanced spreadsheet gets ten. Perception outruns prevalence—even as some cities genuinely grapple with increases (Peiser, 2023).
So… why is toothpaste locked?
Because retailers optimize for loss prevention and customer flow—and lately, the loss-prevention part is shouting. Target, in its own words, is adding guards, locking some items, and partnering with law enforcement and DHS (Target Corporation, 2023). That can be rational if a specific store faces repeated theft in high-demand items that are easy to flip. But it can also backfire: shoppers hate friction, and the visual of a “caged aisle” amplifies fear, regardless of actual risk.
What the politics are doing to the numbers (and vice versa)
Public policy is rushing in. California passed a package of retail-theft bills in 2024, even as PPIC’s statewide data showed declining overall crime but rising shoplifting (Lofstrom, 2025). Across the country, legislators are tweaking thresholds, aggregation rules, and penalties for repeat offenses. The danger is overshooting—writing laws for the viral edge cases rather than for the data-driven middle.
The real costs nobody shares on LinkedIn
Workers feel it first. Clerks and security staff deal with confrontations and the emotional toll of being told “don’t intervene.” That’s a morale and safety problem, not just a spreadsheet line (Peiser, 2023).
Communities lose convenience. If a store shutters, the neighborhood loses access to basics. Even when stores stay, the customer experience degrades behind plexiglass, and the idea of your town changes—toward distrust (Peiser, 2023).
Trust in institutions wobbles. A widely quoted stat gets retracted; another gets walked back on an earnings call; a third is “under review.” People start to believe nobody is telling the truth. That vacuum is where bad ideas thrive (Masters, 2023; Bekiempis, 2023).
Three realities to hold at the same time
Some cities really are seeing more shoplifting than before the pandemic. CCJ’s city-level work and PPIC’s California trends show real increases in specific contexts (Lopez, 2024; Lofstrom, 2025).
The national picture is muddy. FBI data systems conflict; retailer surveys conflate categories; reporting practices shift. Beware sweeping national declarations built on inconsistent foundations (Lopez, 2024; Peiser, 2023).
The most viral numbers have stumbled. NRF withdrew the bombshell “half of shrink is ORC” line. Walgreens softened its own alarm. When the loudest claims wobble, healthy skepticism is a public service (Masters, 2023; Bekiempis, 2023).
How to fix the conversation (and maybe the problem)
1) Get the measurement right.
We need cleaner, comparable data and clarity on categories. FBI should offer plainer guidance on SRS vs. NIBRS comparability. Retailers should publish standardized shrink breakouts and ORC definitions—and stop mixing them in press-ready soundbites (Lopez, 2024).
2) Target the hot spots, not the headlines.
If a handful of districts see elevated shoplifting, surge solutions there: targeted enforcement against fencing networks, smarter store layouts, and community-based interventions. Remember: many thefts are low-dollar and need non-carceral fixes to actually reduce repeat incidents (Peiser, 2023).
3) Design security that doesn’t punish shoppers.
If you must lock items, do it surgically and test alternatives like shelf-level tagging or quick-unlock technology. Treat the Plexiglas wall as the last resort—not the brand (Peiser, 2023).
4) De-politicize the statistics.
When a powerful trade group retracts a marquee claim and keeps lobbying anyway, the public tunes out. Credibility is a currency—spend it carefully (Masters, 2023).
5) Keep workers safe without turning them into cops.
Training and clear “don’t chase” policies matter. Pair that with law-enforcement focus on fencing rings and repeat crews—not one-off poverty thefts (Peiser, 2023).
The narrative shift we need
Locked-up toothpaste feels like the end of something: the end of trust, of convenience, of the idea that a community can take care of itself. But if we let a symbol set policy, we’ll get performative fixes that look tough on TikTok and do nothing in the shrink ledger. The better story is harder to sell—but it works: aim precision tools at real hot spots, clean up the data, and stop letting a few spectacular videos write the laws for 330 million people.
Because in the end, the goal isn’t to free the toothpaste. It’s to lower theft, protect workers, keep stores open, and treat shoppers like neighbors—not suspects. That’s the kind of story worth going viral.
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